At present, then, there are at least two competing images of Sweden prevalent in contemporary US debate. On the one hand, there is the conservative US understanding that Sweden -and to a lesser extent the Nordic countries more generally -represent some form of socialist system. By inference, any policy inspired by Swedish or Nordic precedents can thus be rhetorically 1 "The next supermodel", The Economist, 2 February 2013. The degree of transformation can of course be debated and claims to this effect play a significant political function in the Nordic countries themselves, see for example Greve & Kvist, "Has the Nordic welfare model been transformed?". 2 While this socialist stereotype sometimes applies to 'Europe' as a whole for US conservatives, small states such as Sweden may be more prone to such stereotyping due to limited knowledge about these societies among the broader US public, providing a kind of small-state 'blank canvas'. at home. Combining these two sets of sources -US press reporting on the one hand and Swedish official 'reports on reporting' on the other -does not only provide insights into the development of views of Sweden abroad, it also allows us to trace how these images were relayed back to Sweden with a view of identifying the perils as well as the promises of providing 'Sweden-information' and 'Sweden-publicity' abroad as elements of official Swedish public diplomacy.
The diversity and richness of this material makes it necessary to focus on particular themes and individual media events. The chapter first looks at a series of high-profile issues in Ranging from Palme to Carlsson, the chapter relies on these experiences of Swedish information efforts abroad to raise more general questions about the (im)possibility of purposive public diplomacy and active image management in framing perceptions about states, societies, and peoples. First, it follows up on the preceding phases of the history of Swedish public diplomacy as analysed elsewhere in this volume. Secondly, the chapter theorises on the importance of mutually constitutive images in any attempt at public diplomacy and the tendency towards auto-exoticisation on the part of public diplomats. In particular, it analyses the way in which representations of the nation abroad can be used as a 'diversionary tactic' in domestic political debates. By attracting the attention of foreign audiences, critically engaging with global opinion, and representing Sweden's official foreign policy position as aligned with a significant and outspoken public opinion at home, public diplomacy fulfilled an important function in forming a remarkably persistent globally competitive identity for Sweden as being particularly progressive, solidaristic, or even 'socialist'. This identity or 'brand' served both as an asset and as a liability throughout the period under examination here. 
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The purpose of these news reports was not to provide full coverage of foreign 'published opinion' -as distinct from 'public opinion' -on Sweden, but to chart trends in the socalled Sverigebild ('the Swedish image' or 'the image of Sweden'). The first report noted that while there were several competing Swedish images in some places, people in many other countries had no idea about Sweden at all. While official Sweden had neither the capacity nor the intention to alter or construct anew the Swedish image abroad, implying a kind of arm's length principle with regard to Sweden-information activities, it was nevertheless considered valuable to monitor the most common "misconceptions" about Sweden internationally.5 8 1 F
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The core issue concerned priorities, contrasting the resources spent on the space program with the efforts directed at domestic issues, such as the "race problem" and the war on poverty.5 9 9 F
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To some US observers, as already mentioned, the freezing of diplomatic relations between Sweden and the USA seemed disproportionate. As such, they provided some comic relief to the massive external and internal problems facing the country in the aftermath of the moral defeat in Vietnam. In February 1973, satirist Art Buchwald noted that "every country needs an enemy to call its own" in order not to fall apart. Now, Buchwald worried that the USA would find itself desorientated as US President and long-time hawk Richard Nixon was busy negotiating peace not only with North Vietnam, but also with Mao's China and Brezhnev's Russia. Luckily enough, Buchwald reported with relief, United States National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and his aides had identified the next great danger to America and its values: "It's Sweden". The Swedish aggression was just all too obvious for the Nixon Administration to ignore:
Ideologically, Sweden is against everything we believe in. They're for free medical care, free help for the poor, free homes for the aged and free love for everyone. The European press clippings that the press officers at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs termed it "the 1984 syndrome" in their annual compilations.6 1 9 F
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They were thus acutely aware that there were serious problems in the international image of Sweden by the mid-1980s. But they were also keen to point out that Sweden no longer generated as much negative press in the USA itself. Now, it was rather Western European media that frowned upon Sweden, according the the Ministry. were invited to provide commentary on the declining fortunes of these societies which for so long had been held in high esteem by US academics and intellectuals.6 2 2 F
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By the mid-1980s, the Swedish model, including its proverbial socialism, had evolved into a given frame for the Swedish image -a fixture which foreign reporters on Sweden had to relate to, and a point of reference which Swedish public diplomats could not escape. 47 See e.g. Expertgruppen för forskning om regional utveckling, Offentlig verksamhet. 48 
Swedish self-portrait in the late 1980s
In February 1986 Olof Palme was assassinated -a tragic and traumatic event that in retrospect has been considered the end of the welfare state in Swedish popular historiography. As such, it shook Swedish self-perceptions to the core. 
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References to the image of Sweden abroad became a crucial component in attempts at reimagining the nation at home and regaining a sense of self-identity.
The increased uncertainty about the character of Swedish life and Swedish identity which set in during the 1980s apparently upgraded another dimension of the task of public diplomacy: to not only disseminate information about home abroad, but also to bring information back to home. Through the eyes of the Other, the Self would possibly become more understandable.
This renewed interest in Swedish 'self-portraits' for internal as well as external usage actualised an untimely return to long antiquated ideas such as 'national character', not only through mining historical accounts but also by generating new narratives at a time when nationalism was being 53 Östberg, "Olof Palme i sin tid". 54 Ingvar Carlsson cited in Sverigeinformationen, 7. 55 No SIUP was produced for 1985, most probably due to the excessive workload faced by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the early months of 1986 in the aftermath of the assassination of Prime Minister Palme. However, the relaxation of utopian associations did not only reduce foreign interest, but also decreased foreign desires to unravel the hidden 'dystopia' in the Swedish 'paradise'. SIUP 1986; SIUP 1987; Marklund, "The Social Laboratory". 56 Sverigeinformationen. 57 It is significant that Ambassador Bo Heinebäck, the chief of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs' Press and Information Unit, chose to entitle his opening chapter "Omvärlden är vår spegel" ["The surrounding world is our mirror"], Heinebäck, "Omvärlden". 58 
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As the US criticism of Sweden refocused in the 1980s from Sweden's stand on international issues to the handling of Swedish domestic problems, these concerns were reversed. Now, American journalists cared less about Swedish neutrality than about the Swedish model, by now firmly coded as socialist both abroad and at home despite its mixed economy. Here, Swedish public diplomacy apparently responded to a deeper set of anxieties about the paradoxes of Sweden, the Swedish model and Swedishness -an anxiety which apparently could be to some degree soothed by a measure of autoexoticisation on the part of public diplomats.
The public diplomacy of small states is primarily tasked with capturing attention.
Here, conveying a concentrated 'total image' and a clear message can naturally be a key advantage.
However, strong visions abroad -whether positive or negative, true or false -can also become traps that limit the freedom of movement of the nation's diplomats. It then becomes the obvious task for public diplomacy to nuance the concentrated image which has begun to live a life of its own by providing a more pluralistic and fragmented narrative. The New Sweden Commemoration was not only an attempt at rejuvenating the Swedish image in the USA by reframing the Swedish model as to signify a free-market and explicitly non-socialist welfare state. Importantly, the New Sweden Commemoration was also an attempt to use the image of Sweden abroad as a tool for domestic 77 Glover, National Relations. 78 Nicholas J. Cull identifies "'memes' as ideas capable of being spread from one person to another across a social network". Cull, "Public diplomacy", 31-54. 79 policies, in an equally conceptual bid to move Sweden to the left.6 5 1 F
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In both cases, the imaging of Sweden abroad was understood as largely deceptive, primarily attuned to 'deflecting' inner problems and relaying political messages back home than to engage with foreign audiences as such.
Traditionally, International Relations analysis of "diversionary foreign policy" has focused upon the use of force as a means of deflecting domestic problems or gaining domestic legitimacy.6 5 2 F 82 However, we may also consider the use of criticism of foreign agents as a tool of public diplomacy alongside the more traditional goal of attraction.6 5 3 F
83
If small states indeed have to fight for attention, one way of doing so is simply to make trouble, to raise uncomfortable issues and to make moral judgments where others are sticking to Realpolitik, thus engaging with or awakening global opinion. By singling out specific political problems overseas, such as US aggression in Vietnam or the apartheid regime in South Africa, official Sweden did not only speak its mind and reflect domestic public opinion, but it also made itself attractive at home and abroad.
This understanding of public diplomacy as a type of 'diversionary domestic policy' differs from most cases of public diplomacy and nation branding which are usually uncontroversial and benign, often bordering on the bland, in their avoidance of any deliberate provocations. Here, In the second case, the 'Swedish self-portrait' as seen in the USA could serve as a mirror for the utopian domestic project of revamping the supposedly stagnating Swedish model of old, into a new vision of an open, efficient and competitive society. In this sense, both these experiences of Swedish public diplomacy directed at US audiences exemplify the way in which public diplomacy can be understood as not only a way of reaching out and engaging with foreign audiences as is traditionally held. On a fundamental level, public diplomacy can also be concerned with providing a particular kind of 'heterotopia', as an 'other space' for internal political projections and cultural selfreflections -just as the reflection that you see in the mirror does not exist, yet the mirror is a real object that shapes the way you relate to your own image.6 5 6 F 86 85 A possible parallel could be found in Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 formulation of 'the American Creed' as a specifically US moral standard which the discrimination against African-Americans violated. See also SIUP 1973, 51. 86 Foucault, "Of other spaces, Heterotopias", 46-9.
